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Anglo-Argentina commercial relations.  It explores notions of informal empire in 
South America and the dynamics of Anglo-Argentine and US-Argentine relations.  
At the centre of the analysis is Sir Malcolm Robertson, the British ambassador to 
Buenos Aires, whose activities were negatively impacted by British prejudice 
towards the region.  This is the first evaluation of the mission since the 1980s and is 
based on a wider reading of UK archives.  It is WKHILUVWDQDO\VLVRI5REHUWVRQ¶V
diplomatic career. 
Key words: Britain; Argentina; diplomats; diplomacy; commerce. 
 
%ULWDLQ¶VUHODWLRQVZLWK6RXWK$PHULFDGuring the first half of the twentieth century 
have not received a great deal of historical attention.  What little material exists has 
focussed on the technical aspects of questions relating to the application of tariffs, 
stamp duty and the operation of most favoured nation status agreements.  Within this 
QDUURZIUDPHZRUNWKHRYHUZKHOPLQJIRFXVKDVEHHQRQ%ULWDLQ¶VUHODWLRQVZLWK
Argentina and their bearing RQ8QLWHG6WDWHV¶GLSORPDWLFVWUDWHJ\LQ6RXWK$PHULFD
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In particular, scholars have addressed the turf war between the British and American 
governments for the Argentine markets, especially in beef products, railway rolling 
stock and in fine textiles.  Little attempt has been made to view these issues through 
the lens of British commercial diplomacy.  This is, of course, a large subject, and one 
that cannot be addressed in its entirety here.  Yet, the parameters of this topic can he 
understood in part through the examination of a single case study; the context and 
FRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQWRGHVSDWFKDWUDGHPLVVLRQWR
South America in the summer of 1929.  Led by the former ambassador to Berlin, 
9LVFRXQW'¶$EHUQRQLWVSULQFLSDOIRcus was on Argentina and Brazil.  The work of 
the mission was first examined by Roger Gravil as long ago as the 1970s and has 
only recently been reappraised by the present author, based on different 
documentation, as part of a major new international study RI%ULWDLQ¶VUHODWLRQVZLWK
South America.1  However, this fresh examination suggests that, for reasons that will 
become apparent in this article, the British diplomatic and political context to the 
mission are arguably of greater significance to scholars of Anglo-Argentine relations 
WKDQWKHHQGHDYRXUVRI'¶$EHUQRQDQGKLVFROOHDJXHV2ISDUWLFXODULPSRUWDQFHLV
the role played by the ambassador to Buenos Aires, Sir Malcolm Robertson.  It fell to 
him the task of interpreting the terms of the commercial agreement and it was he who 
was in the firing line when the negotiations stalled in the autumn of 1929.  This 




implement the terms of the agreement.  It also affords an opportunity to examine the 
way in which three departments of the British government worked together to 
develop a commercial policy in a region of the world whose potential had hitherto 
been undervalued.  There was a clear departmental hierarchy in how the Foreign 
Office, the Treasury and the Board of Trade discussed and formulated policy.  This 
placed the Foreign Office at the top of the chain of influence in a distinct senior role 
that was in marked contrast to the turf wars of the earlier 1920s with the Treasury 
concerning the German reparation question. 
$VKDVDOUHDG\EHHQVXJJHVWHGWKHKLVWRULRJUDSK\RI%ULWDLQ¶VUHODWLRQVZLWK6RXWK
America in the early twentieth century is very small; there has been little discussion about 
cultural, political or diplomatic issues.2  Within that literature, such analysis of the work 
RIWKHWUDGHPLVVLRQDVWKHUHKDVEHHQLVFRQFHUQHGZLWK'¶$EHUQRQ¶VUROHDVLWV
head.   Furthermore, contemporary accounts E\ERWK'¶$EHUQRQDQG5REHUWVRQ
HPSKDVLVHDWOHQJWKZKDWWKH\GHHPHGWREHWKHPLVVLRQ¶VVXFFHVV 3  This view remained 
XQFKDOOHQJHGXQWLO*UDYLO¶VDFFRXQWZDVSXEOLVKHGLQWKHV 4  He concluded that the 
RSWLPLVPRI'¶$EHUQRQDQG5REHUWVRQZDVXQIRXnded and that the trade mission had 
actually legitimised British commercial exploitation of Argentina. 5  This view was then 
contextualised in a series of studies by American scholars, notably Paul B. Goodwin, Carl 
Solberg and Joseph S. Tulchin, who mapped the objectives of the mission and Anglo-
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Argentine commercial relations against the objective of the United States in South 
America.6  They argued that this region became a commercial battleground between 
Britain and the United States in the 1920s; that the origins of that rivalry went as far back 
as the mid nineteenth century and that it continued well into the Cold War era.  The 
American literature makes full reference to Argentine sources as well as some of the 
British archival material.  These studies do not concern themselves directly with the 
success of the mission, but assume that the rationale behind British commercial policy 
was flawed.   
These later historical accounts relate closely to scholarship on international political 
economy in South America, where the 1929 mission is viewed as a case study in 
dependence theory.  This is premised on the view that most relations between states 
are determined by a pattern of domination and subservience; a hypothesis expressed 
in the work of the Chilean political scientist, Theotonio dos Santos.7  To him, the 
reason why Britain was able to secure such a favourable deal with the government of 
the charismatic Argentine President, Hipólito Yrigoyen in 1929 was because of 
British predominance in technological, commercial and capital resources; in much 
the same way as the same resources were used to subjugate the colonies that made up 
the British Empire.8  This notion of informal empire resulted in a close relationship 




argued that hitherto international political economists have failed to understand the 
importance of the venture capitalist strata, and have focussed too much on the wider 
commercial relationship between Britain and the countries of South America.9  
Goodwin views the commercial relationship between Britain and Argentina in the 
VDVIXQGDPHQWDOO\XQHTXDODFRQFOXVLRQWKDWQHLWKHU'¶$EHrnon nor Robertson 
would have disputed.     
The question of unequal status was also reflected in the way in which the British Foreign 
Office viewed South America.  While the official position was that it was a region of high 
importance, the overwhelming diplomatic focus of the Foreign Office remained firmly 
fixed on Europe and North America.  The 1929 trade mission did nothing to change that.  
Indeed, while there were to be a number of rumblings of discontent about Peronism in the 
1950s and Argentine claims to sovereignty of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia, no 
major shift of emphasis within the Foreign Office occurred until the war of 1982.10  Until 
then, to the British government, the countries of South America occupied a strange 
twilight world that lay somewhere between their recognition as a collection of 
independent nation states and an informal extension of the British Empire.  Just as there 
was an expectation that the Colonies would accord Britain special status in international 
commerce, the same was expected of South American trading partners, especially 
$UJHQWLQDDQG%UD]LO7KLVZDVQRWDQµXQVSRNHQDVVXPSWLRQ¶RQEHKDOIRIWKH%ULWLVK
government, but was, as this article will discuss, an open and clearly articulated part of 
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how Whitehall and the trade mission viewed these countries.  The ambiguous approach to 
South American diplomacy was also reflected in the British diplomatic presence based 
there.  As it took anywhere between three and six weeks to reach the continent by boat 
from Britain, few high flying diplomats were attracted to postings in what was seen as a 
remote backwater.  There were exceptions to this of course, and one of them is the 
subject of this article, but there was an informal prejudice also at work.  Because of their 
willingness to take on such positions, Robertson and his ilk were frequently viewed as 
lacking sufficient élan for the more high profile postings in Europe and in North America.  
Similarly, the Foreign Office not infrequently viewed South America as a convenient 
dumping ground for those diplomats considered troublesome or whose competence was 
in question.   
Of all the countries in South America, it was the modern, industrial economy of 
Argentina that was of greatest significance to Britain.  Anglo-Argentine trade relations 
covered a wide range of commodities, from beef exports, synthetic fabrics to servicing 
the railway system, much of which had been built by British engineers in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.  Commercial relations had been formalised 
through the visits of a series of delegations from London to Buenos Aires: in 1911; a 
VPDOOHQWRXUDJHRI%ULWLVKLQGXVWULDOLVWVYLVLWHG%XHQRV$LUHVLQDQGWKH'¶$EHUQRQ
mission of 1929, which gave rise to the despatch of an Argentine delegation to London in 





context.  International commerce cannot be fully understood any other way, certainly not 
between modern industrial countries.  It will briefly outline the main objectives of the 
1929 mission, and will then move on to discuss how the British and Argentine 
governments interacted in the months that followed to bring the agreement to the point of 
signature. The main focus will be on the contribution of the British head of mission in 
Buenos Aires, Sir Malcolm Robertson, to the negotiations and how they were viewed in 
London and in Argentina.  This offers fresh insights into how the British government 
actually viewed commercial relations with Argentina and the strategies it was prepared to 
DGRSWLQRUGHUWRREWDLQDQDJUHHPHQWWKDWZDVLQ%ULWDLQ¶VLnterests.  It also provides an 
important opportunity to observe the way in which the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade 
and the Treasury were capable of working together regarding an issue of mutual 
importance.  
Tariffs and their imposition was a sensitive and controversial issue for the British 
government in the early decades of the twentieth century.  The context to the debate 
was an era when a period of stagnation within the British Empire had done not 
enough to obviate the cost of its administration.  The aftermath of the First World 
War had shifted the tariff debate onto trade with Europe.  At this time, the imposition 
of tariffs was also forming an important part of Argentine economic planning.11  The 
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rapidly expanding economy sought to optimise its exports of agricultural and cattle 
products.  In this it was largely successful, with as much as forty percent of goods 
going for export by 1923.12  At the same time, this expansion took place at a time 
when many Argentine industrialists wished to broaden the economy into consumer 
goods.  It coincided with the adverse effects of global overproduction of cattle 
products which resulted in a dramatic decline in earnings from those exports.13  
However, it was the decision of the French, Spanish and Italian governments to raise 
tariffs on imports from Argentina in the mid 1920s that created the possibility for the 
British government to raise the question of tariffs with the Argentines.  In 1927, 
another opportunity occurred when the United States government prohibited imports 
of fresh and refrigerated Argentine meat.14 The Yrigoyen government therefore 
decided that the beef trade with Britain deserved special protection.15  Consequently, 
ZKHQWKH'¶$EHUQRQ mission arrived, the Argentine economy was contracting; a 
process which the consequences of the visit did nothing to ameliorate.   
There were three principal reasons why the Anglo-Argentine commercial agreement 
of 1929 came into being.  The first of these was the foundation of British and 
American commercial relations with Argentina during the early twentieth century.  
This was based on most favoured nation treatment of goods between the respective 
agreements.  Regarding Britain, the Argentines operated a policy of unconditional 
most favoured nation status to all imports.  That is, that concessions made to a third 
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party were automatically added to those made to other third parties.  Relations 
between Argentina and the United States operated differently.  Here, most favoured 
nation status worked on the basis that an agreement granted as a concession to a third 
party was offered only to countries prepared to make a similar gesture.16  Yrigoyen 
was convinced that the British were more likely to maintain their approach to 
commercial relations with Argentina than the Americans.  The second impetus came 
from the decision of the American President-elect, Herbert Hoover, to visit Argentina 
in December 1928.  He was keen to play down any initiative that smacked of 
American commercial aggression in the region. 17  However, Robertson was not 
convinced, informing the Foreign Office that: µ7KH United States under Hoover 
means to dominate this continent by hook or by crook. It is British interests that 
FKLHIO\VWDQGLQWKHZD\7KHVHDUHWREHERXJKWRXWRUNLFNHGRXW¶ 18   
The principal fear was that the American government would try to buy out the 
British share of the Argentine railway infrastructure.  On this issue, the British 
government had cause to be optimistic.  As Robertson reported, Yirogyen was 
µHQWLUHO\VDWLVILHGZLWK%ULWLVKFDSital generally and with the British railways in 
SDUWLFXODU¶7KH%ULWLVKKDGµOR\DOO\GRQHWKHLUEHVW¶WRKHOSGHYHORS$UJHQWLQD$QG
WKDWKHKDGOLWWOHUHDVRQWRVHHWKHUDLOZD\IUDQFKLVHVWRµEHVROGWRDQ\RQHZKRHYHU
WKH\PD\EH¶<HW5REHUWVRQZas aware that the situation was not as 
straightforward as the President had made out.  Shares could be bought on the open 
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market and small shareholders might feel compelled to sell to larger ones and 
nothing could be done about that.  Robertson formed the impression that Yirogoyen 
was keen to make sure this situation did not come about but was unclear how he 
could prevent it.  Robertson also suggested that the Argentine government prohibit 
the sale of public utility companies into other hands except with government consent.  
5REHUWVRQQRWHGWKDWWKHµDODUP¶DWWKHSURVSHFWRIWKHVDOHRIWKH%ULWLVKUDLOZD\V
ZDVµZLGHVSUHDG¶DFURVVWKHFRXQWU\ 19   He assured the Foreign Office that 
$UJHQWLQHRSSRVLWLRQWR$PHULFDQRZQHUVKLSRIWKHUDLOZD\V\VWHPZDVµSHUPDQHQW¶
although he expected the United States government to be persistent in trying to 
secure a monopoly.  Robertson also encouraged British pro-activity because the 
Anglophile Yrigoyen was aging and that there was little reason to believe that his 
successor might be as amenable to concluding a commercial agreement with Britain, 
especially one on such favourable terms.20   
5REHUWVRQ¶VDWWLWXGHDQGKLVJRRGSHUVRQDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK<ULJR\HQFUHDWHGWKH
circumstances for the third factor that influenced the BULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQ
WRGHVSDWFKDFRPPHUFLDOPLVVLRQWR6RXWK$PHULFD$IWHU+RRYHU¶VGHOHJDWLRQKDG
departed, advisers and confidants close to Yrigoyen informed Robertson that the 
President would welcome a similar visit from Britain because, as '¶$EHUQRQlater 
put it, the British were µregarded as less aggressive, less domineering and less 
inclined to use force in support of financial and commercial claims¶.21 At least two of 
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these factors place Robertson at the heart of the thinking that led to the decision to 
despatch a British commercial mission to South America, which the Board of Trade 
WRRNLQ-XO\<HW5REHUWVRQ¶VUROHKDVEHHQGRZQSOD\HGHYHQRYHUORRNHGE\
PDQ\KLVWRULDQVZKRKDYHH[DPLQHG%ULWDLQ¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKDWSDUWRIWKHZRrld.  
This article aims in part to correct this. 
7KH%ULWLVKWUDGHPLVVLRQFRQVLVWHGRIVL[PHPEHUV9LVFRXQW'¶$EHUQRQSir 
William Clare Lees, a cotton textile manufacturer; Julian Piggott of Roland and Piggott, a 
nominee of the National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers; W. Howard-
Williams of the Agricultural Engineers Association; H.W. Wiswould, of the Department 
of Overseas Trade and H.Owen Chalkley, one of the commercial counsellors of the 
British Embassy in Buenos Aires.  Edgar VincenW9LVFRXQW'¶$EHUQRQERUQZDVD
Liberal peer and former ambassador to Berlin, 1920-1926.  His personal profile was high 
in 1929 because of the publication of the first volume of his Berlin diary.  Before his 
diplomatic career, he had been a well-known international financier and was a former 
Governor of the Imperial Ottoman Bank.  Although not a specialist on South American 
commerce, he was viewed as a man of the world who possessed a deep understanding of 
contemporary international relations. Never RQHIRUKLJKLQWHOOHFWXDOLVP'¶$EHUQRQ¶V
strategic approach was flexible and straightforward.  His forte was diplomacy through 
personal friendship, with one commentator on the mission describing him as having the 





convinces me of the exceptional prescience of Your Excellency in initiating the 
negotiation.  The utility of the Convention ± even the necessity for it ± in assuring the 
GHYHORSPHQWRIUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQRXUWZRFRXQWULHVEHFRPHVHYHU\GD\PRUHDSSDUHQW¶23  
$WWKHVDPHWLPHLWZDVLPSRUWDQWWR'¶$EHUQRQthat the commercial agreement would 
be merely the starting point of a closer relationship between the two countries.  It would 
be µGHSORUDEO\GHIHFWLYH¶WRDVVXPHWKDWE\FRQFOXGLQJDQDJUHHPHQWEDVHGRQUHFLSURFDO
most favoured nation status, the future development of trade relations between the two 
countries would be assured. 24  In fact, it was incumbent on the British government to 
UDLVHLWVFRPPHUFLDOJDPHLQ6RXWK$PHULFDWKDWKLWKHUWRWKHUHKDGEHHQWRRPXFKµVHOI-
satisfied inactivity.¶25   
Sir Malcolm Robertson, born 1877, had been appointed ambassador to Argentina in 
1927.  He had been minister plenipotentiary in Buenos Aires since 1925, and 
concurrently held the post of Minister Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Paraguay 
until 1929.  He had also enjoyed a stint in Rio de Janeiro as FKDUJpG¶DIIDLUHV 
between 1912 and 1915.  Consequently, few British diplomats possessed knowledge 
of South American diplomacy, commerce and politics to rival Robertson.  While he 
did not leave a large cache of private papers, his archival footprint is extensive in the 
papers of the Foreign Office General Correspondence Series (FO371) for Argentina, 
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as well as in the files of the Treasury and the Board of Trade.26  He was viewed by 
the Foreign Office as moderate and sensible and was prized because he had a good 
personal relationship with Yrigoyen.  However, we do know how he viewed the 1929 
trade mission.  In January 1930, he was invited to give a lecture about its significance 
to Anglo-Argentine relations to the Institute of International Affairs in London.   
'¶$EHUQRQKDGDGGUHVVHGWKHVDPHDXGLHQFHWZRPRQWKVHDUOLHUDQGLWLVLQWHUHVWLQJ
to compare their accounts.27  :KLOH'¶$EHUQRQviewed the success of the mission in 
terms of its ability to make its commercial case, Robertson was keen to emphasise 
the role played by Yrigoyen.28  He saw many similarities between the foreign 
policies of Britain and Argentina.  Both countries, he thought, had perfected the art 
RIEHLQJµJHQXLQHO\QHXWUDO¶29  However, his definition of neutrality was not entirely 
how the term would be understood today; but was a policy of disengagement from 
the affairs of neighbouring states with the option of a more robust role should 
FLUFXPVWDQFHVZDUUDQWLW/LNHWKH%ULWLVKWKH$UJHQWLQHVZHUHµLQWHQVHO\SDFLILF¶
DQGµalways ready to go to arbitration¶ZLWKµJRRGJUDFH¶%RWKFRXQWULHVVKDUHGDQ
µLQFUHGLEOHWROHUDQFH¶RIIRUHLJQFXOWXUHVWKDWZDVµhardly known outside these 
islands¶VWHPPLQJLQSDUWIURPWKHFRVPRSROLWDQQDWXUHRIWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHWUDGLQJ
communities. 30  All of this was in marked contrast with the United States.  While 




prepared to sign treaties that guaranteed, inter alia, territorial borders, the Americans 
KDGQRW&RQVHTXHQWO\µWKHXJO\ZRUG,PSHULDOLVP¶ was frequently used to 
describe American commercial policy in Latin and South America.31  Robertson 
WKRXJKWWKDW$UJHQWLQDPLJKWIDOOYLFWLPWR$PHULFDQFRPPHUFLDOµLPSHULDOLVP¶
because international bodies such as the League of Nations would be powerless to 
prevent it because neither countries were members.32   
Robertson played a central role in paving the way for the arrival of the trade mission.  
As early as December 1925, he had lobbied the British Chamber of Commerce in 
Buenos Aires on the need for a formalisation of relations between the two countries 
because WKHµGD\VRIRXUDEVROXWHVXSUHPDF\LQGHHGRXUYLUWXDOPRQRSRO\KDYH
JRQHQHYHUWRUHWXUQ:HKDYHEHHQRXVWHGLQPDQ\SODFHVPDQ\OLQHV¶33  Robertson 
realised that this situation stemmed in part from a PDODLVHZLWKLQ%ULWDLQ¶s interwar 
economy that had seen exports stagnate at a time when there was growing 
international competition for a share of the market.34  As he later reflected µwe do not 
display the energy, imaginaWLRQHQWHUSULVHDQGVHOOLQJFDSDFLW\RIROG¶ 35  He had 
good grounds for being concerned.  As Robertson prepared for the arrival of the 
mission, the Argentine tabloid, La Action, claimed that the United States had designs 
on the Buenos Aires and Pacific Railway; a direct challenge to the British 
monopoly.36   Similar rumours began to circulate about American plans to buy up 




may as well pack up and get oXW¶38  
7KH'¶$EHUQRQPLVVLRQDUULYHGDQGZDVUHFHLYHGE\<LULJR\HQRQ$XJXVW
$FFRUGLQJWR5REHUWVRQ'¶$EHUQRQ¶VVSHHFKRIZHOFRPHµFRXOGKDUGO\KDYHEHHQ





comes, converting into reality the hopes of our youth as a laborious people, and 
EULQJVLQWKHSHUVRQRIKLVFROODERUDWRUVDGHHSNQRZOHGJHRIWKHFRXQWU\¶
Robertson assured the outgoing British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, that the 
ZRUNRIWKHPLVVLRQKDGVWDUWHGµXQGHUWKHEHVWSRVVLEOHDXVSLFHV¶40  That said, 
'¶$EHUQRQ¶VVSHHFKZDVTXLUN\LQWKDWKHWDONHGPRUHDERXWKRZKHKDGKHOSHG
secure German economic recovery during his embassy in Berlin than about how the 
trade mission could optimise Anglo-Argentine commercial relations.  Nevertheless, 




The attitude of England throughout the whole of this period has been that of a 
world peace maker.  We have endeavoured to compose differences between 
old antagonists and establish normal relations of friendship throughout 
Central Europe.  What we desire is the reestablishment of favourable 
conditions for commercial interchange and commercial development.  This is 
the intelligent interest of the whole world.41 
$VSHHFKPDGHE\'¶$EHUQRQRQWKHVDPHGD\WRWKH%ULWLVK&KDPEHURI&RPPHUFH
in Buenos Aires adopted a similar tone.42  Robertson described it as being 
µFKDUDFWHULVHGE\LPSUHVVLYHRSWLPLVPUHJDUGLQJ%ULWLVKFRPPHUFHDQGLQGXVWU\¶
However, the most notable aspect of speech was the hint that there might have to be 
an increase in imperial preference in response to public opiniRQ'¶$EHUQRQDOVR
EHFDPHVRPHWKLQJRIDPHGLDFHOHEULW\GXULQJWKHPLVVLRQ¶VVWD\LQWKH$UJHQWLQH
capital.  All of his speeches were widely reported in the Argentine newspapers, 
although they received no verbatim coverage in the British press.  The substance of 
his speech to the Chamber of Commerce was reported in La Prensa on 26 August; 
WKHDUWLFOHDUJXLQJWKDWWDULIISURWHFWLRQZDVµVKRUWVLJKWHG¶7ZRGD\VODWHUWKH
British Financial Times SXEOLVKHGDOHWWHUIURPµDFRQVWUXFWLYHFULWLF¶WKDWDUJXHGthat 
µWKHUHZDVDOZD\VWKHSRVVLELOLW\VKRXOGWKHLQGXVWULDOFULVLVLQ*UHDW%ULWDLQEHFRPH




selected to head the mission.43  ,WZDVKLVUROHWRµSHUVXDGH$UJHQWLQHIULHQGVQRWWR
IROORZDSROLF\WKDWPLJKWFRQFHLYDEO\VHQGWKHPZHOODORQJWKHURDGWRUXLQ¶7KH
Diario Español took a different tack.  It was keen to contrast the work of the British 
PLVVLRQZLWKWKDWRILWVUHFHQWO\GHSDUWHG$PHULFDQFRXQWHUSDUWµ&RQWUDU\WRZKDW
happened with the visit of Mr Hoover, which gave rise to justifiable resentment, that 
RI/RUG'¶$EHUQRQDQGKLVPLVVLRQKDVFDXVHGJHQHUDOVDWLVIDFWLRQLQWKHZKROH
republic, since Argentines are convinced that they have nothing to fear from the 
LQFUHDVHRIHFRQRPLFDQGILQDQFLDOUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶44 
So what then was the outcome of the 1929 British trade mission to Argentina?  The 
negotiations concluded with an obligation on the part of the Argentine government to 
purchase nine million pounds worth of equipment for the railway system in return for 
British guarantees to buy a reciprocal amount of goods from the rural sector of the 
Argentine economy.  Robertson believed that the British government had µobtained 
VRPHWKLQJIRUQRWKLQJ¶45  Furthermore, this had come about because Yrigoyen had 
wanted to PDNHµDJUHDWPRUDOJHVWXUH
WRZDUGV*UHDW%ULWDLQ46  Not all Argentine 
politicians, however, appreciated YriJR\HQ¶VPDJQDQLPLW\:KHQLQ1RYHPEHU
1929, the President announced a fifty percent tariff reduction on yarns and cloth 
containing artificial silk imported from Britain, Yrigoyen was criticised for being too 
accommodating. 47 That said, the remainder of the terms of the agreement were 
approved by the Argentine Chamber with only little dissent, although it never came 
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into law because the Yrigoyen government was ousted from office in a coup in 
September 1930.48  However, as early as December 1929, there were already 
suggestions that the outcome of the trade mission had been too one-sided and that the 
GRPHVWLF$UJHQWLQHRSSRVLWLRQZDVµnot exactly a good augury for the immediate 
progress of the treaty proposal.¶49 By June 1930, public opposition to the agreement 
was vocal and direct.  In the view of the newspaper, La Prensa, the Senate should 
UHMHFWDSURSRVDOWKDWZDVµLOO-conceived and one-sided¶, although for complex 
constitutional reasons, that body was never formally asked to do so.50  The stalling 
led the British Chamber of Commerce in Buenos Aires to declare in November 1931 
that the mission had been a failure.51  This conclusion was instrumental in the 
GHFLVLRQLQWKHDXWXPQRIWRUHYLVLWWKHRXWFRPHVRIWKH'¶$EHUQRQPLVVLRQ
and the decision by the Argentines to despatch a delegation to London, headed by 
Vice-President Julio A. Boca. The resulting Boca-Runciman Treaty, concluded in 
1933, had far-UHDFKLQJHIIHFWVRQWKHVWUXFWXUHRI%ULWDLQ¶VUHODWLRQVZLWK$UJHQWLQD 
It is clear that the main business of sorting out the fine technical details of the 
DJUHHPHQWZDVQHYHU'¶$EHUQRQ¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\EXWIHOOWR5REHUWVRQ7KHPDLQ
debate between the Foreign Office, the Treasury and the Board of Trade concerning 
how to bring the commercial agreement to fruition stemmed from a summary of 
three telegrams Robertson despatched to the Foreign Office on 2 September 1929.  
One possibility that the British government might like to consider, Robertson 
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advised, was to make block purchases of Argentine goods.  These would be cheaper 
overall and thus more beneficial to British industry. There was a useful precedent for 
this as it would mirror the agreement the Argentines had brokered with France two 
years earlier.  Robertson was keen to emphasise, as he always had done, that it was 
vitally important for the British government to formalise commercial relations with 
Argentina because of the threat of competition from other European powers and from 
WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV$VKHWROG+HQGHUVRQµ,WZRXOGEHWUDJLFLIZHZHUHWR miss the 
present opportunity which is most favourable to us in every way and I earnestly beg 
WKDW+LV0DMHVW\¶V*RYHUQPHQWZLOOJLYHPRVWV\PSDWKHWLFFRQVLGHUDWLRQWRWKH
SULQFLSOHRIWKHSURSRVDOVDQGVHQGDUHSO\DWWKHHDUOLHVWSRVVLEOHPRPHQW¶52  In 
eVVHQFHWKLVZDVWREHWKHVXEVWDQFHDQGWRQHRI5REHUWVRQ¶VPHVVDJHWRWKH)RUHLJQ
Office for the two months that followed, until his departure from Buenos Aires in 
November 1929. 
+RZHYHU5REHUWVRQ¶VUHTXHVWIRUDFOHDUVWHHURQKRZWRSURFHHGDQGODWHU, for 
authorisation to sign the agreement on behalf of the British government, led to a 
period of hesitancy, procrastination and cumbersome bureaucratic wrangling in 
Whitehall.  This undermined his position in Buenos Aires, and led to him being made 
a scapegoat for the slow progress in the negotiations by both the British and by the 
Argentine government.  The principal protagonists in this debate were: Sir Edward 
Crowe, Comptroller General of the Department of Overseas Trade; Sir Thomas St 
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Quintin Hill of the Board of Trade; and Sir Bernard Gilbert of the Treasury.  
5REHUWVRQ¶VGHVSDWFKHVZHUHDOVRUHDGDQGFRPPHQWHGRQE\WKHKHDGRIWKH
American Department at the Foreign Office, Thomas Maitland Snow.  Created in 
1865, the American department dealt single-handedly with all British foreign policy 
matter relating to North, Central and South America; a situation that did not change 
until the Eden Reforms of 1942-43 that saw the creation of three separate 
departments to deal respectively with these regions.53 
It ZDV6QRZZKREURXJKWWR&URZH¶VDWWHQWLRQ5REHUWVRQ¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWµ$UJHQWLQH
SURGXFHPXVWEHJLYHQIUHHHQWU\LQWR8QLWHG.LQJGRPDWDQ\FRVW¶ 54   Snow asked 
the Department of Overseas Trade, the Board of Trade and the Treasury to 
collaborate to bring tKLVWRSDVV6QRZ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHGLDORJXHLQGLFDWHVWKDW
the Foreign Office wished to provide the main steer for the results of the negotiations 
while leaving the technical details to the Board of Trade and to the Treasury.55  This 
division of labour worked harmoniously for the most part, and provides an 
interesting contrast to the inter-departmental turf wars that occurred over, for 
example, the implementation and reform of the Reparation (Recovery) Act just a few 
years before.56  Likewise, there was also a clear hierarchy of departmental seniority 
during the discussions that required the Board of Trade to obtain the agreement of 
the Treasury for proceeding; a process that the Treasury was then required to adopt 
with the Foreign Office.  The chain of command also worked in reverse, with 
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material being passed from the Foreign Office to the Treasury and then on to the 
%RDUGRI7UDGH&RQVHTXHQWO\&URZHVKDUHG5REHUWVRQ¶VGHVSDWFKRI6HSWHPEHU
with F. Phillips of the Treasury, who then passed it on to Sir Henry Payne at the 
Board of Trade.57   
,Q%XHQRV$LUHV5REHUWVRQZDVILOOHGZLWKDVHQVHRIXUJHQF\µ,DPPRUHWKDQHYHU
convinced present opportunity of coming to terms with President should not be 
missed as immense immediate development of British WUDGHLVZLWKLQUHDFK¶58  He 
was also keen to ensure that the British government would expedite the 
implementation of the commercial agreement, ideally before the mission had left 
South America. 59  7KH%RDUGRI7UDGH¶VUHVSRQVHZDVPRUHPHDVXUHGDQGUHIOHFtive, 
but nevertheless agreed to approve the agreement subject to the resolution of 
technical details relating to methods of payments for goods.60  However, Robertson 
EHOLHYHGWKDWHYHQDPLQRUGHOD\ZRXOGKDYHQHJDWLYHUHSHUFXVVLRQVIRU%ULWDLQ¶V
relations with the Yrigoyen government.  Emphasising the closeness of his 
UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH3UHVLGHQW5REHUWVRQDUJXHGWKDWKHZDVFODPRXULQJWRµJLYH>D@
VWULNLQJH[DPSOHWRWKHZRUOGRI$UJHQWLQHIULHQGVKLSIRU%ULWDLQ¶DQGWKDWµGHWDLOV
are of little importDQFHWRKLP¶<ULJR\HQZDVFRQFHUQHGWKDWWKHPLVVLRQVKRXOGQRW
OHDYHµZLWKRXWSXEOLFHYLGHQFHRIGHILQLWHDFKLHYHPHQW¶5REHUWVRQYLHZHGµZLWK
JUHDWDODUP¶DQ\VXJJHVWLRQRIDGHOD\LQVLJQLQJWKHDJUHHPHQW61  These despatches 
and some of those that followed also illustrate the negative side of his relationship 
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with Yrigoyen; that the President expected Robertson to remove singlehandedly the 
obstacles that were to emerge to signature of the agreement.  That he did not 
appreciate that Robertson had little influence over the methods of working of the 
GHSDUWPHQWVRIWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWWKDWZHUHGHDOLQJZLWKWKHLVVXHV'¶$EHUQRQ
ZDVNHHQWRRIIHUKLVVXSSRUWIRU5REHUWVRQ¶VVHQVHRIXUJHQF\+HLQIRUPHGWKH
Board of Trade that Yrigoyen was prepared to add a clause to the agreement that 




natural tendency towards gushing over-optimism.  After a three hour meeting with 
Yrigoyen on 7 September, the two men had managed to persuade the Argentine 
President to agree to all aspects of the commercial agreement.  The only sticking 
SRLQWZDVWKHTXHVWLRQRISXEOLFDWLRQRIWKHWHUPV'¶$EHUQRQUHSRUWHGWKDW
<ULJR\HQLQVLVWHGWKDWIXOOGLVFORVXUHZDVµLQGLVSHQVDEOHEHIRUHWKHGHSDUWXUHRIWKH
0LVVLRQ¶63  However, both realised that such an eventuality was unlikely because the 
British government would not permit full publication until it had been ratified by 
Parliament.  This point seems to have been lost on Yrigoyen, although there is little 








EHLQJORVW¶64   
5REHUWVRQ¶VVROXWLRQZDVWRDVN<ULJR\HQZKHWKHUKHZRXOGEHVDWLVILHGif the British 
government agreed to publish a summary of the agreement, rather than the complete 
text.  He sought permission to this effect from the Foreign Office.  Robertson argued 
that such a move could be couched as a gesture of good faith between the two 
governments.65  But Robertson was stymied by an eight day hiatus during which the 
Foreign Office, the Treasury and the Board of Trade mulled over their response.  
There are other examples of an ambassador being left without instructions for a 
similar period in such circumstances within the annals of British commercial 
diplomacy during the 1920s, and the impression that such a bureaucratic approach to 
diplomatic decision making conveyed abroad seems to have been of little 
consequence to the British government.66 





rDSLGO\DVSRVVLEOH¶67  However, he gave no indication that he intended to acquiesce 
LQ5REHUWVRQ¶VUHTXHVWEXWDQQRXQFHGLQVWHDGWKDWKHZLVKHGWRFRQIHUIXUWKHUZLWK
the Board of Trade and with the Treasury.  This process took a further eight days, the 
result of which was a letter from Hill to Phillips stating that the Board of Trade were 
content to approve a summary of the agreement for publication.68  The Treasury 
UHPDLQHGVLOHQW%\WKLVWLPH5REHUWVRQ¶VSRVLWLRQKDGEHFRPHPRUHH[SRVHG
because he had ORVW'¶$EHUQRQDVDQDOO\LQQHJRWLDWLQJZLWK<ULJR\HQDVWKH
mission had left Buenos Aires on 8 September for Montevideo.   
Its departure also brought about a change in the attitude of the Argentine President in 
his dealings with the British government.  The polite platitudes about concluding a 
mutually beneficial trade agreement and the importance of having Britain as a 
trading partner were replaced by increasingly hardnosed requests for amendments 
and adjustments to the text.  Many of these were complex and technical and of the 
kind that Robertson felt compelled to seek expert advice from London.  By 25 
September, Robertson had grown tired of waiting for instructions and expressed his 






The following day, Robertson finally received his instructions, but they were not 
what he was hoping for. 70  The Foreign Office, the Treasury and the Board of Trade 
remained embroiled in the legal question about publication of the text of the 
agreement and whether there was any way of expediting the process of ratification.  
Furthermore, closer inspection of the agreement by the Treasury and Board of Trade 
had revealed a number of queries that would have to be resolved before the 
agreement could be ratified.  Robertson therefore received the powers to sign the 
commercial agreement on behalf of the British government but only after all of these 
matters had been resolved.71  Again he chose to wait before expressing his 
frustration.  By mid October, he had come up with his own solution to the delay.  He 
asked Henderson SHUPLVVLRQWRVLJQWKHDJUHHPHQWEXWWRµOHDYHGHWDLOVRIRSHUDWLRQ
WREHZRUNHGRXWVXEVHTXHQWO\E\ILQDQFLDOH[SHUWV¶LQRUGHUWRDYRLGµHQGOHVV
GHOD\V¶72  However, the Treasury and Board of Overseas Trade rejected this idea, 
DQWLFLSDWLQJWKDWµZKLOHGHVLULQJWREHKHOSIXO¶LWZRXOGµRQO\SXWXVDOOLQWRDIUHVK
GLIILFXOW\¶73  The problem being that both departments continued to anticipate that 
the plan would require an Act of Parliament; an opinion Robertson did not share.74  
He saw little reason why the British government could not sign at least part of the 
agreement, an opinion shared by Yrigoyen.  The President interpreted the delay as a 




µV\PSDWK\DQGJRRGIHHOLQJV¶LQFUHDVHGµHYHU\GD\¶75   
%\2FWREHU+LOOZDVVWDUWLQJWREHFRPHUHFHSWLYHWR5REHUWVRQ¶VVXJJHVWLRQ1RW
least because of concerns that delay might impede the flow of Anglo-Argentine 
trade.  At the same time, Hill harboured concerns that the appointment of a panel of 
experts to resolve the fine details of the agreement might hamper any further 
commercial initiatives between the two countries.  Furthermore, the deliberations of 
the experts might add rather than remove levels of technical complexity.  It was 
LPSRUWDQWWKDWDQ\µSRVVLELOLW\RIVLJQDWXUHXQGHUPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJVKRXOGEH
DYRLGHGDWDOOFRVWV¶76  Before authorising instructions to Robertson, Hill requested 
more time to consider the matter and suggested enlisting the advice of the Lord Privy 
Seal, James Thomas.77  
,Q%XHQRV$LUHV5REHUWVRQ¶VDQ[LHWLHVDERXWWKHDJUHHPHQWHVFDODWHGZKHQWKH
Argentine Congress failed to form a quorum to ratify it.  In a telegram that was to 
have long lasting repercussion, Robertson vented his spleen to Henderson on 28 
October. 78  Robertson believed that an insufficient number of deputies had attended 
the debate on the commercial treaty because they thought that the British government 
KDGORVWLQWHUHVWLQLW+HIHOWµFRQVLGHUDEOHXQHDVLQHVV¶DERXWWKHIXWXUHRIWKH




cannot now guarantee that President would agree to signature even if I received 
QHFHVVDU\DXWKRULVDWLRQ¶$IXUWKHUUHDVRQZK\WKHDJUHHPHQWZDVYLHZHGQHJDWLYHO\
ZDVEHFDXVHLWµJLYHVXVHYHU\DGYDQWDJHDQG$UJHQWLQHQRQH¶)XUWKHUPRUHRWKHU
countries that wished to trade with Argentina had used the hiatus in the negotiations 
µWRSURVSHU¶79  Robertson was also unhappy with the continuing long silence from 
WKH)RUHLJQ2IILFH%RDUGRI7UDGHDQGWKH7UHDVXU\µ1HLWKHUP\ILQDQFLDODGYLVHU
here nor I can understand what risks are being incurred by HMG compared with 
LPSRUWDQFHRIVHFXULQJXQH[SHFWHGRUGHUVIRU%ULWLVKLQGXVWU\¶+LVVHQVHRI
helplessness and frustration were compounded by the fact that he had received no 
concrete instructions for more than a fortnight.80 
5REHUWVRQ¶VWHOHJUDPFRPSHOOHG6QRZWRFDOODFRQIHUHQFHZLWKUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRI
the three government departments involved in the commercial negotiations the 
following day.  The only record of what was said is a long memorandum from 
Gilbert to his Treasury colleague, Phillips. 81  This makes it clear that Gilbert saw 
5REHUWVRQDVEHLQJSDUWO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHKLDWXVµ7KHDPEDVVDGRUDSSHDUVWR






that the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade were more sympathetic to 
5REHUWVRQ¶VSOLJKWDQGKDGµWDNHQVHULRXVO\¶KLVDUJXPHQWVDERXWWKHHIIHFWRI
prolonged delay on Anglo-Argentine commercial relations.  What follows in this 
important insight into how British commercial diplomacy worked at this time is also 
very revealing for another reason.  It demonstrates that in negotiating the commercial 
agreement with the Argentine government, the British government had always been 
aware that the terms were far more beneficial to Britain.  That in Argentina there was 
DµJURZLQJUHDOLVDWLRQWKDWDOOWKHEHQHILWLVRQRXUVLGH¶ 83  Consequently, the time 
had now passed for a successful conclusion of the agreement. 
*LOEHUW¶VDQDO\VLVHOLFLWHGVWURQJREMHFWLRQVIURP&URZHDQGIURP6ir Horace 
Hamilton, the Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade.  Both felt that to withdraw 
IURPWKHDJUHHPHQWZRXOGµEHDVHULRXVEORZIRURXUWUDGHQRWPHUHO\LQWKH
$UJHQWLQHEXWLQ6>RXWK@$PHULFDJHQHUDOO\¶84  The President of the Board of Trade, 
:LOOLDP*UDKDPµIHOWVWURQJO\WKDWWKHDJUHHPHQWRXJKWQRWWRIDOOWKURXJKDQ\IDXOW
RQRXUVLGH¶7KDWKHZRXOGEHZLOOLQJWRVXSSRUWDQ\OHJLVODWLRQWKDWZDVQHFHVVDU\
to enable the British government to uphold its half of the agreement. But in order to 
guarantee the value of the goods coming from Argentina, Robertson should be 
authorised to sign the agreement on condition that items were quoted in gold pesos 
and that it would only come into operation on ratification rather than on signature. 85  
Concerns were expressed by Snow, Crowe and others about linking Argentine 
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exports to the value of the peso; in which case, should a financial margin be built into 




Trade.87   
Gilbert appreciated that if the commercial agreement with Argentina was not signed, 
LWZRXOGPDNHWKH%RDUGRI7UDGHµYHU\VDG¶EXWWKHµUHDOWURXEOH¶ZDVWKDWµWKH
$UJHQWLQHJRYHUQPHQWKDYHUHDOLVHGWKDWLWJLYHVPXFKWRXVDQGQRWKLQJWRWKHP¶
The desire of the Board of Trade to push forward for signature was likely to make it 
µH[WUHPHO\GLIILFXOWWRJHWIURPWKHPDIWHUZDUGVDZRUNLQJXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶
&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHUHZHUHµWKXVYHU\VWURQJDUJXPHQWVIRUUHIXVLQJWRFRPPLW
RXUVHOYHV¶7KH$UJHQWLQHVZHUHIree to trade with Britain irrespective of whether 
there was a trade agreement in place or not.  Gilbert then went on to criticise 
'¶$EHUQRQ¶VUROHLQWKHQHJRWLDWLRQV,QDOOSUREDELOLW\µWKHDJUHHPHQWE\LWVHOI
PHDQVYHU\OLWWOH¶WRWKH$UJHQWLQHVDQGWKat, in reality, it amounted to little more that 
µDVWXEERUQILQDQFLDOIDFDGHEXLOWE\/RUG'¶$EHUQRQURXQGZKDWHYHUDUJXPHQWKH
XVHGWRSHUVXDGHWKH$UJHQWLQHV>WRVLJQWKHDJUHHPHQW@¶,WZDVQRZFOHDUWKDWWKH




DOORZHGWRVLJQWKHDJUHHPHQWHYHQWKRXJKµ,GRQRWDWDOOOLNHWKHSRVLWLRQ¶89   
However, Robertson now faced fresh difficulties.  His analysis of Yrigoyen had 
proved to be accurate, and by late October 1929, it was clear that the Argentine 
President intended to use the delay in signing the commercial agreement to drive a 
harder bargain with the British government.  Robertson was unaware of the 
substance of the inter-departmental debate that was taking place in London.  But as if 
to underline the misgivings expressed by Gilbert, Yrigoyen coincidentally chose that 
point by stating that the Argentine government would not sign the agreement if its 
terms continued to be applied to meat products as well as to cereals.  This 
represented a major new development in the negotiations because Robertson was 
fully aware that an agreement concerning meat products, railway rolling stock and 
tariffs on artificial fabrics formed the core of the agreement.  Robertson tried to 
SHUVXDGH<ULJR\HQWRDEDQGRQWKHLGHDµ,XVHGZKDWDUJXPHQWV,FRXOGEXWIDLOHGWR
PRYHKLP¶90   
,Q/RQGRQWKHUHVSRQVHWR5REHUWVRQ¶VODWHVWPLVVLYHDERXW<ULJR\HQ¶VFKDQJHRI
tack was twofold.  It galvanised Hill into drafting a set of draft instructions, which he 
also circulated to the Treasury and the Foreign Office, authorising Robertson to sign 
the commercial agreement with immediate effect.91  7KHGHEDWHDERXW+LOO¶VWH[WWKHQ 
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door of the Treasury.92  In the meantime, the Foreign Office was keen to demonstrate 
continued faith in Robertson by advising how he could persuade Yrigoyen to have a 
change of heart over the beef issue.  On 6 November, Robertson proved worthy of 
the confidence of his masters and reported that he had managed to persuade 
Yrigoyen to drop his objection.93  Two days later, he received the authority to sign 
the commercial agreement between the British and Argentine government, some two 
PRQWKVDIWHUWKHGHSDUWXUHRIWKH'¶$EHUQRQPLVVLRQIURP%XHQRV$LUHV2Q
November, Robertson received a lengthy telegram summarising what had been the 
Treasury objections but in a format that made it clear that the Foreign Office 
believed that the cause of the delay in signing the commercial agreement lay not with 
5REHUWVRQEXWZLWKWKH$UJHQWLQHJRYHUQPHQWµ$ll of these risks would be obviated 
if you are able to obtain consent of President to working arrangements set out in 
telegram that had been in the hands of the Argentine minister for foreign affairs for 
ILYHZHHNV¶94  A week later, Robertson returned to London, to be replaced as 
ambassador in Buenos Aires by Eugen Millington-Drake.  In a letter that was clearly 
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intended to convey Foreign Office faith in Robertson, Snow recommended to Gilbert 
WKDWµZHVKRXOGEHIRUWLILHG¶E\KLVµDXWKRULWDWLYHRSLQLRQ¶95  But for Robertson this 
demonstration of confidence came too late; he immediately retired from the British 
Diplomatic Service, surrendering his pension. 
Commercial relations between states are a relatively understudied aspect of 
international history.  They are frequently viewed as either secondary to the politics 
of diplomatic interaction or as a dry, inaccessible area of investigation, the province 
only of those with a technical knowledge of economic history and theory.  However, 
historians of the modern industrial world overlook them at their peril.  During the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, international trade formed the basis of the imperial 
power and reach of the majority of the larger states in Europe and established for the 
first time the notion of a global economy.  Thus commercial diplomacy should be at 
the heart rather than at the periphery of how we view all aspects of British and 
French imperial history, for example.  Historians are not as good at this as they 
should be.  Still less are they willing to venture into the world of what could be 
termed the statecraft of commercial diplomacy, that is, the establishment and 
operation of the various government infrastructures that existed to facilitate and lead 
this aspect of national foreign policy.  The purpose of this article has been, in part, to 
provide a reminder of the existence of these factors and how they operated in one 
case study.  That said, it is far from remarkable to conclude that, in the great scheme 
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of British commercial imperial and foreign policy in the twentieth, relations with the 
countries of South America was not a major priority.  That was the case throughout 
the first half of the twentieth century and beyond; the 1929 trade mission therefore 
changed little in the long as well as in the short term.  Yet studying this small 
snapshot of Anglo-Argentine relations does offer some important insights into the 
%ULWLVKGLSORPDWLFPLQGVHWDEURDG)LUVWWKHUHLVWKHILJXUHRI'¶$EHUQRQKLPVHOI
Although very much a man of the moment in 1929, this septuagenarian hardly 
epitomised the image of the post-First World War modern model of British diplomat.  
While he was undoubtedly a financial expert, his intellectual and linguistic reference 
points were very much that of a late nineteenth century imperialist.  It was never his 
intention to bring an element of equilibrium to Anglo-Argentine relations but simply 
to ensure that the imbalance that had existed since the 1880s continued to operate in 
%ULWDLQ¶VIDYRXU,WLVRIFRXUVHWKHSXUSRVHRIany financial negotiation to achieve 
the optimum deal with the minimum of concessions to the partner, but the trade 
mission of 1929 did this through the use of openly imperialist language.  Indeed, 
ERWK'¶$EHUQRQDQG5REHUWVRQFOHDUO\ZURWHDERXW$UJHQWLQD as a kind of informal 
member of the British Empire in a way that would have been unthinkable in a 
GLVFXVVLRQRI%ULWDLQ¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKHHTXDOO\PRGHUQ(XURSHDQHFRQRPLHVRIIRU
example, Germany and France.  Second, there is the notion of distance.  5REHUWVRQ¶V
experience does convey a strong sense that a posting to South America marked the 
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graveyard of ambition for a British diplomat.  But, it is interesting to consider 
whether one reason why South America was viewed in this semi-imperialist manner 
wDVEHFDXVHTXLWHOLWHUDOO\LWWRRNDVORQJWRUHDFKDVSDUWVDV%ULWDLQ¶VSULQFLSDO
imperial territories.  The practicalities of diplomatic contact especially would also 
have been the same.  Third, there is the question of the strategic aspirations of the 
United States and how they influenced British diplomacy in South America.  The 
context to the mission, its work and the aftermath of the commercial agreement that 
stemmed from it suggests that the notion of a British-American rivalry for influence 
in the region can be overstated.96  7KHHYLGHQFHIURP5REHUWVRQ¶VGHVSDWFKHVDQG
'¶$EHUQRQ¶VFRPPHQWVVXJJHVWWKDWLIWKHUHZDVDWXUIZDUDWDOOLWZDVODUJHO\
UKHWRULFDO7KHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWWKH$PHULFDQJRYHUQPHQWFRXOGVWHDO%ULWDLQ¶V
thunder in commercial relations with Argentina was a useful ploy to chivvy along the 
negotiations but never amounted to a legitimate, sustained threat.  That is not to 
suggest that the United States had little interest in trading with the most modern 
economy in South America or that we should downplay the importance of the 
Monroe Doctrine to American foreign policy.  Both were significant, but not of as 
great a magnitude to the United States during the massive boom period  of economic 
and commercial expansion in the 1920s as capitalising on the post-First World War 




spread of communism in Latin and South America grew.  Finally, this article 
provides an insight into the statecraft of British commercial diplomacy and how the 
bureaucracy of inter-departmental co-operation tended to hamper rather than 
expedite the formation of policy and the despatch of diplomatic instructions.  In the 
decade since the end of the First World War, the organisation of the Foreign Office 
in particular had undergone radical change, through the expansion in the number of 
geographical departments and through the greater democratisation of recruitment to 
the British Diplomatic Service.97  This took place against the backdrop of the 
unprecedented complexity of post-war diplomacy, combined with the growing 
ambition of other government departments to play a role in the foreign policy 
formulation process.  $V5REHUWVRQ¶VH[SHULHQFHGHPRQVWUDWHGWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHVH
changes had yet to produce an efficient framework within which to consider aspects 
of commercial diplomacy.  This was a situation that remained unchanged as the 
1920s gave way to the third decade of the twentieth century that offered very 
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